Knowledge is "Right opinion accompanied by a logos"
or "justified true belief" (JTB - the Classic View)
 Agrees with Plato
Knowledge differs from belief in that knowledge is accompanied by justification (a logos); mere belief is unjustified  Agrees with Plato
Justifying a belief requires showing that it is necessarily true = cannot possibly be false
(mere unjustified belief can be true or false)
 Agrees with Plato
Because knolwedge is necessarily true, the object of knowledge must be that which is truely real (the object of belief is  that which merely appears)  Agrees with Plato
Because knowledge is necessarily true, the object of knolwedge must be unchanging, and therefore "timeless"  Agrees with Plato
Because the object of  knowledge is timeless,  individual physical objects cannot be objects of knowledge (they are objects of mere opinion)  Agrees with Plato
When we have knolwedge, the object of that knolwedge is  grasped by the mind (nous)  Agrees with Plato
That which is grasped by the mind is  Form Agrees with Plato
Form is that which is Changeless and universal Agrees with Plato
The Form of a thing is that which it is to be that thing; its "whatness, or "essence;" the Form makes it what it is, or "gives it its being" Agrees with Plato
Forms exist in Another world "beyond" the physical which is eternal, changeless and "divine" only in the primary beings or "substances" of which the one and only real world is constituted
The relationship between Forms and physical objects is one of imperfect imitation or participation of something physical in another non-physical perfect "standard" or ideal of that thing one which makes the primary being what it is
Because of this relationship, the Form and a physical object must exist apart; separated by a vast "gap" (chorismos) only together in a primary being; the Form can be separated from the individual being in which it exists only in thought, never in reality
For each kind of reality there is but a single Form as many forms as there are individual particular primary beings that are members of that infimae species; each being has its own Form, but the Form in each one is "commensurate" with all members of the species
A physical object differs from a Form in that it is but one of many imperfect copies of a single perfect ideal a primary being is a hylomorphic compound of both form and matter
Change in the physical world is due to its imperfection; the perfect cannot change the matter in a primary being actualizing the potentialities given to that being by its form which moves that primary being in a manner determined by its goal or end (telos)
The dominant exemplar of knowledge is mathematics; arithmatic and geometry biology, natural history
Assuming that this exemplar gives us knowledge requires assuming the objective reality of the non-physical entities which are the Forms of mathematical and geometrical knowledge the objective reality of the distinct "natural kinds" which form the infimae species of primary beings (that these categories exist as universal kinds in reality, not just constructs of a scheme of ordering the things in reality)
Because of this dominant exemplar, the seeker of knowledge is directed away from the physical world to eternal changeless objects "seen" only with the mind. towards the world of change, coming-into-being and perishing perceived with the senses
The role of the sensory perception in gaining knowledge is relatively minor; as imperfect copies they can remind the seeker of knowledge of the perfect Forms which lies "forgotten" (innate) in the soul absolutely essential for only in the sense perception of the particular individual is that which is universal in the substance known to the mind
The grasp of the foundational propositions of knolwedge is achieved by dialectical reasoning from hypothetical definitions until one reaches an irrefutable, hence necessarily true, "real" or "essential" definition, from which all further knowledge then follows by rational deduction an act of "rational intuition" in which the grasp of the essential form by the mind gives one direct knowledge of what it is to be that thing without deducing such "basic truths" from yet more basic propostions. 
The resulting system of knolwedge reembles a vast "geometry" of theorems, the truths we can know, deduced from axioms, the real definitions of the highest level Forms a vast hierarchical natural history in which knowledge of  is expressed in "basic truths" appropriate to  each kind of being