by: Joshua Canzona
This paper was awarded the Loyola University History Award for Outstanding History Senior Thesis for the 2002-2003 Academic Year.
But their memories ere shall remain for us,
And their names, bright names, without stain for us;
The glory they won shall not wane for us,
In legend and lay
Our heroes in gray
Shall forever live over again for us.
-CSA, Father Abram Ryan1
No General in Civil War history saw his post-bellum
reputation plummet farther or faster than Confederate General James Longstreet.
The man who outranked even Stonewall Jackson in the army of Northern Virginia,
was subsequently ostracized by his old comrades because he dared to join the
hated Republican party after Appomattox. By throwing his lot in with a bi-racial
party of African Americans, northerners, and other supporters of Reconstruction,
he was seen as a traitor to the white Southern cause. Had Longstreet remained
aloof from the political sphere, he would have entered into the pantheon of
Confederate heroes at the side of Jackson and the deified Lee. Instead, while
living in New Orleans he chose a very different path. Unraveling this mystery
and seeking the Generals motivations for this self-destructive political
shift is a challenge requiring careful examination. In this way it becomes clear
that James Longstreet voiced his unpopular opinions because he honestly believed
that in cooperating with the Union the South could be more swiftly healed.
As an old soldier, Longstreet proved incapable of navigating the charged political
climate of the Reconstruction era. He spoke his mind and watched his reputation
crumble as a result. It did not help that he set up residence in New Orleans,
one of the most volatile cities of the post-war era. A realist, he had
accepted the Confederate defeat and endeavored to fashion a livelihood in the
postwar nation, remarks one historian, and it was this pragmatism that
marked his life in the Crescent City with such emotional hardship.2
During his ten years in New Orleans, the public image of Longstreet in the South
shifted from war hero to archetypal scalawag. Examining Longstreets motivations
during this period and the specifics regarding his fall from grace can provide
some insight into both the man and the South as a whole during the Reconstruction
era. Significantly, the question arises, did Longstreet indeed have an honest
belief in Republican politics and rebuilding the South, or was he driven by
a desire for personal gain? The answer strikes at the heart of the lost
cause mythology.
Longstreets reputation as a military officer was pristine at the end of
the war. The Confederate congress praised him as a commander of great prudence
and skill in a joint resolution of gratitude for his efforts.3
General Lee favored him with the nickname of my old war horse and
Longstreet carried a grave wound from his battles on behalf of the Confederacy.
His men held him in great affection for the care he took in planning operations
and referring to him affectionately as Ole Pete. His defensive tactics
recognized the changing technologies of the era and the responsive measures
necessary on the part of the commanding General. Compared to the Napoleonic
tactics that characterized the Civil War, Longstreets strategies were
light-years ahead of their time.4 As a result, Longstreet possessed
a war record that placed him in a position to become one of the most cherished
heroes of the developing Confederate pantheon.
After the war, Longstreet moved to New Orleans where the environment was characterized
by anger, resentment, conflict, and violence. Reconstruction-Era Louisiana teetered
on the brink of disaster due to the factionalism in its politics. Questions
concerning the political status of ex-Confederates and the social standing of
freed blacks led to resentment among the populace and riots in the streets.5
This was not an environment for amateurs such as Longstreet whose blunt persona
served soldiering far more effectively than politics. He was, it soon became
apparent, out of his league in New Orleans and events were just beginning to
heat up. One of the key tensions of the Reconstruction era was the damage to
the southern identity an identity that that had been based, at least
in part, on an ideology of slavery and racism. The white citizens of New Orleans
saw the black population not only freed from the bonds of slavery, but also
serving among the ranks of the police, legislature, and courts. Black police
officers infuriated whites by actually performing their jobs and taking firearms
away from citizens who brandished their weapons in public. David Blight, a modern
Civil War scholar, describes these strained race relations, The bulk of
white Southerners had experienced the psychological trauma of defeat; their
world had been turned upside down, and they simply could not abide the presence
of assertive blacks wearing uniforms and carrying guns, organizing union leagues,
or voting and serving in the legislature and on the judicial bench.6
This was a period of great tension and perhaps of desperation as well. White
southerners needed to cooperate with their governments to move forward, but
found in those very administrations a threat to their culture and personal identity.
In the end, the emotionally charged atmosphere led to the creation of an intense
hatred for those who seemed to be abandoning the cause by supporting,
or worse, benefiting from the Republican Party.
Another aspect of this environment and an integral piece of the Longstreet puzzle
was the development mythology of the lost cause. This nebulous term
refers to the revisionist history of the Confederacy as interpreted by post-war
Southern whites. Its essential tenets include: the belief that the Union victory
was due solely to superior manpower and resources, that the war was not about
slavery, that slavery would have been phased out in a new Confederacy, and that
the cause of the Southern soldier was one of glory and honor. Some of these
broad statements have elements of truth in them, but the context for viewing
the Civil War that they are used to create (in which the South is without sin
and most of her higher commanders are deified) is blatantly false.7
Longstreets life in New Orleans must be placed within the context of the
growing mythology of the lost cause. William Piston in his popular
biography of Longstreet writes, By making defeat seem honorable, the lost
cause rationale heightened the Souths already high concept of honor. Consequently,
no group of men ever incurred greater dishonor in the eyes of their peers than
the minority of white Southerners who supported the Republicans.8
Longstreet was not just going against social mores in the South, he had unknowingly
become the villain in the developing fairy tale of brilliant commanders, southern
belles, and dancing slaves. This context is vital to the current historical
understanding of General Longstreet, but at the time the man could never have
known what force he was defying.
Longstreet evidently saw some economic opportunities for himself in New Orleans,
but they later proved to be illusions. Perhaps he believed that because it was
seized early in the war by the Union, and was not a bombed out husk, that the
city would quickly rebound as a bustling port where he could find a new beginning.
He set himself up as a member in the cotton brokerage of Longstreet, Owen, and
Company at number 27 Union Street. He also entered the insurance business as
a member of Southern and Western Life and Accident Insurance Company at number
21 Carondelet Street. Unfortunately, he did not do as well financially as he
had hoped.9 One Longstreet family anecdote concerning both
the Generals generosity and the poverty of the era tells us, For
several years after the war, Confederate veterans would come by the Generals
house and tell him theyd just shot a Yankee. The General knew what they
were up to. They were poor and thought this would win his favor. The General
would play along and give them handouts of food.10 Railroads
had stolen most of the New Orleans cotton trade, the city suffered economically,
and many residents remained poor as Reconstruction moved forward.
Longstreet suffered a number of physical maladies during his years in New Orleans
that handicapped his efforts to build a civilian career. The General received
his most severe injury, a gunshot that ruptured his cervix, at the Battle of
the Wilderness on May 6 of 1864. Modern scholarship holds that this wound was
caused by Longstreets own men who had mistaken him for the enemy in a
circumstance eerily similar to that which killed General Stonewall Jackson.11
I received a severe shock from a minie ball, Longstreet later revealed,
passing through my throat and right shoulder. The blow lifted me from
the saddle, and my right arm dropped to my side, but I settled back to my seat
and started to ride on, when in a minute the flow of blood admonished me that
my work for the day was done.12 The ball had torn through
the Generals throat and lodged in his right shoulder, thus preventing
him from using his right hand effectively. In one letter Longstreet, I
hope that you will excuse this note as I cannot use a pen with any facility,
with my left hand, with any facility (sic). This wound haunted Longstreet
for the rest of his life and was listed as his cause of death in January of
1904 when it reopened. The lingering pain was compounded when he worked as a
surveyor in the swamps of Louisiana amidst sweltering hot and diseased conditions.
Longstreet endured his bad health, bravely, and tried to turn around his financial
luck, but a lucky break was not forthcoming and his bills soon piled up.
Longstreets financial trouble rapidly moved from bad to worse as his business
ventures failed and his debts accumulated. The best insight into Longstreets
financial situation during this period comes through his correspondence with
the Virginia Military Institute concerning the tuition for his son Garland.
These letters and the financial ledgers of the Virginia Military
Institute that pertained to the Longstreet balance can be found in the archives
of the New Orleans Public Library as part of a court case that was eventually
brought against Longstreet.13 These documents have apparently
gone largely unnoticed since their inclusion in the archives. Longstreet wrote
to Francis Smith, the head of the institute, in December of 1868 to explain
his financial situation, I regret to say
that I am entirely out of
resources and offer no assurances that I should have any soon.14
Francis Smith was forced to reply to Longstreet, whom he apparently held in
high regard, with repeated requests for the tuition payment. I would again,
Smith wrote, call your attention to the heavy balance due to this institution
on account of your son.15 For Longstreet, the noble
general, to go so long without paying for his own sons military education
proves the severity of his post-war financial crisis.
In October 1870 the ledger of the Virginia Military Institute shows Longstreets
balance at $1407.90. It was paid down to $1107.90 amidst explanation on the
part of Longstreet that his wife had forgotten to mail the check. In the summer
of 1871 the institute was compelled to write to Longstreet, The pressure
upon us at this time, since instances involving legal process, compels my appeal
to you to close the balance for your sons education.16
The balance, however, was not closed and eventually legal proceedings were brought
in State of Virginia v. Longstreet with a court date set for May 23, 1872. The
General, in fact, had to pay up, but it seems that his financial luck was finally
improving at this time after seven years of hardship.
It is necessary to note, however, that Longstreets hardships during those
first seven years were not merely financial, but social as well. The distinguished
General renounced the bitterness expressed by some of his former comrades and
supported certain Reconstruction policies less than two years after Appomattox.
Thus, it was very early in the new life he was trying to create for himself
in New Orleans that he was urging Southerners to accept their losses and work
on rebuilding the economy.17 His most infamous action during
this period was to write a series of editorial letters to the New Orleans city
papers espousing his post-bellum ideology. This was not received well at all
by his former comrades in the Confederacy and it is not hard to see why. In
one letter Longstreet writes, The ideas that divided political parties
before the war upon the rights of the States were thoroughly discussed
by our wisest statesmen, and eventually appealed to the arbitratement of the
sword. The decision was in favor of the North, so that her construction becomes
the law, and should be so accepted.18 Longstreet declared
the doctrine of a soldier and not a politician and since the war now was one
of ideology this did not work in his favor.
The obscuring mists of the lost cause mythology make it difficult
to examine Longstreets motivations. The Generals contemporaries
and some historians have argued that Longstreets actions were the result
of character flaws. Others suggested that Longstreet was inept or otherwise
confused when he became a Republican. This latter interpretation seems unlikely,
however, given that Longstreet expresses in his letters a clearly defined belief
that cooperation is the best course for the former Confederate states. Also,
Longstreets sincere dedication to every professional endeavor that engaged
him until the end of his life is a clear sign of his competence. His failure
to allow lingering hatred from the war to shape his views should not be used
as an indicator of feeble-mindedness on his part.
Some of Longstreets detractors have suggested that he joined the Republican
Party solely for pecuniary reasons. And it is true that the end of Longstreets
most serious money problems can be attributed to his good fortune in receiving
a number of government appointments. Within a year of his political conversion
he saw his social position change from debtor to surveyor of customs in New
Orleans and adjutant General of the Louisiana state militia. In addition to
these appointments, he was also made the president of the New Orleans and Northeastern
Railroad. By the end of the year he was earning an estimated ten to fifteen
thousand dollars in these positions.19 In terms of purchasing
power this would be the equivalent of over $200,000 a year in modern United
States currency.20
The question then, and one that is key in determining the character of the Generals
political motivations, is whether he received these positions as a direct result
of his Republican politics. A surface examination of his financial turnaround
might lead one to this conclusion, but there is a time gap to be accounted for.
Longstreet first wrote a letter stating his support for Republican doctrines
of cooperation with Reconstruction programs in the summer of 1867. Although
Republican newspapers praised his views, Longstreet soon found himself socially
ostracized in white New Orleans.21 Surely his financial interests
in both the cotton and insurance companies that bore his name did not motivate
these decisions. Considering that his politics were Republican as early as 1867
and that he was still so impoverished that he was going to debtors court a long
five years later, it is impossible to make a direct connection between his political
shift and his financial gain. Arguing that no good and righteous Southern gentleman
would become a Republican without an ulterior, financial motive is ridiculous;
another answer
must be found to explain the good fortune of General Longstreet.
Longstreet received his first appointments during the Presidential administration
of Ulysses Grant who was extending a kindness to an old friend from West Point.
It was common for old friends to end up on opposite sides of the Civil War,
and it was not unusual that friendships continued after its close. Grant, however,
was occupied in Washington, D.C. and Longstreet lived nearly a thousand miles
away in New Orleans. For the time that was a significant distance and their
lack of contact after the war does not necessarily mean that they did not give
strong consideration to the friendship they shared. In fact, Longstreets
occasional visits to Grant after the war demonstrate an effort on his part to
rebuild ties with his old friend in high office. Grants gesture towards
Longstreet in the form of granting him a government appointment that he sorely
needed should not be seen as outside of the ordinary political behavior of the
19th century. In a New York Times article Longstreet spoke of his first meeting
with Grant after the end of the war: The next time we met was at Appomattox,
and the first thing that General Grant said to me when we stepped inside, placing
his hand in mine was, Pete, let us have another game of brag, to recall
the days that were so pleasant. Great God! I thought to myself, how my
heart swells out to such magnanimous touch of humanity. Why do men fight who
were born to be brothers?22 Thus, Longstreet gave affirmation
to the friendship that he shared with Grant and provided insight into the motivations
for the conciliatory politics that ruined his reputation in the South.
A sense of honor and duty drove James Longstreet and the politics he voiced
were the politics he believed in. His poverty was not immediately alleviated
as a result of his changing parties and he initially received nothing except
the scorn of his former friends in return for his honest opinions. This was
a man who honestly felt that the South would be best served by acknowledging
their Northern victors and working to unify the country once more. He raised
his pen in the hope that his words and his reputation would be enough to cut
through the tangled web of New Orleans politics and to shed new light onto the
Southern condition after Appomattox. He failed in this endeavor and, then, unexpectedly
he was called upon to draw his sword.
The incendiary environment of New Orleans finally exploded when an effort to
overthrow the Government of William H. Kellogg, a hated Republican, was made.
The Republican Party in New Orleans had split into two groups by 1872. The Warmoth
faction, led by Louisiana Governor Henry C. Warmoth, and Kelloggs Customs
House faction both vied for the support of the national party and control
of the state government. Longstreet, now very caught up in the political scene
of New Orleans, allied himself with Warmoths group and used what influence
he had with the Grant administration and the Republican party to support the
governor. As a result, Longstreet renounced all three of his high-paying positions:
the customs house, position as General of the state militia, and railroad presidency.
In return he was given a position as the leader of the militia forces stationed
in New Orleans. For a second time the General proved that he had the courage
to follow through with his convictions in spite of financial loss.23
In the end, the factions merged to support Kellogg as their next candidate for
governor of Louisiana.
The results of Louisianas governors election in 1872 were contested.
The rampant corruption common to Louisiana, and the United States as a whole
after the Civil War, made the voting process questionable. Republican factionalism
in New Orleans had given way to pragmatism and the party united behind a single
candidate. The Republicans claimed a victory for their candidate, William H.
Kellogg, and the Democrats stood behind John McEnry. A congressional committee
investigated the problem and resolved that McEnry was the rightful victor, but
a bill concerning the matter never found its way to the floor. Rival legislatures
inducted both men to the governors seat on the same day and President
Grant had to step in and resolve the issue by throwing his support behind Kellogg
with an executive order.24
The 1872 election is of the utmost importance in understanding the chaotic environment
in which Longstreet was attempting to build his home and business. Today, contested
election results give rise to sarcastic bumper stickers and Larry King specials.
In New Orleans of 1874, the stage was set for violence with Longstreet in a
government appointed position in which he was charged with keeping the peace.
The General left the table at Appomattox only to find himself looking in the
New Orleans papers each day for the latest incident of severe political conflict
or violence in the city streets that might propel him once more into the fray.
To try and stick to his guns in such an atmosphere was an incredibly difficult
proposition, and to predict what was going to happen next would have been impossible.
The political fiasco churned until the opposing sides launched the largest street
fight in American history. Angry Democrats had formed the aptly named Crescent
City White League to protest the Kellogg administration and Republican rule.
The militia and the police, on the other hand, who were charged with keeping
peace in the riotous post-election environment in New Orleans included several
black officers. The white citizens of New Orleans had strong resentment for
the bi-racial force controlled by Northern politicians that patrolled the city,
and now they had a vehicle through which they would strike back. Clashes between
the two groups became frequent. New Orleans had literally become a war-zone
and an aged and wounded General James Longstreet, as head of the New Orleans
militia, found himself again in a position at the center of a battle.
Violent reactions from ex-confederates to the changes in the Southern lifestyle
after the war were not unusual, but the response against the Kellogg government
was unique in its force and fervor. White rage let quickly to individual
and organized violence against the churches, schools, homes, farmsteads, and
bodies of black citizens, as well as their white Republican allies, writes
David Blight of the Reconstruction period across the South.25
Protests, deadly lynchings, and even the execution of Republican officeholders
were common. But a trained paramilitary army in the streets in an effort to
overthrow a state Reconstruction government was a scene unique to New Orleans.
On August 30th, 1874 the White League executed six Republican officeholders
and the Kellogg government declared martial law. Two weeks after the executions,
on September 14th, the forces of the White League made their move. A number
of men who had fought for the former Confederacy were again armed and put into
formation. Their target was the Louisiana state house, then located at the corner
of Toulouse and Chartres streets in the Vieux Carré. A full-scale battle
was on and the rioters were armed, organized, angry, and had a force that was
experienced and trained in the art of making war. Longstreet was now doing more
than expressing unpopular political opinions, he was facing off in battle against
his former comrades.
The catalyst for the Battle of September 14th, also known as the Battle for
New Orleans Freedom or the Battle of Liberty Place, was a shipment of arms abroad
the steamship Mississippi. The White Leaguers had arranged for a weapons shipment
to augment their growing supplies and Longstreet, who was aware of their growing
strength, wanted to move to intercept it. The General set his force, consisting
of 600 police officers and 3,000 militiamen, in a defensive formation along
a line from Jackson Square to Canal Street. Also, to further block access to
the shipment, he had forces set up between the Custom House and the river. The
8,000 armed White Leaguers, who had organized into a military chain-of-command
under general Fred N. Ogden, marched to engage Longstreet that afternoon.26
The anger, resentment, and sheer tenacity of the White Leaguers carried the
day as they rushed Longstreets troops. Battle cries and gunshots rang
out across the Vieux Carré as Longstreets militiamen broke and
ran in all directions and even jumped into the river to escape the onslaught.
The New Orleans Times reported, They (White Leaguers) received the fire
of the Metropolitans without flinching and kept straight on in their charge.
Seeing this, the Metropolitans wavered, scattered, an rushed off toward the
Custom House. The police and militia were taking fire from an organized
army of twice their number and from snipers set up in various buildings. Longstreets
force was pushed back to Jackson Square where he made a final effort to disperse
the rebels.27
The Battle of Liberty Place went poorly for Longstreet and he was extremely
lucky to have escaped alive. Officers had to work to keep their men from firing
at Longstreet, a man many perceived as vile scalawag and traitor, who was riding
upon a horse trying to marshal his troops. As his troops broke and ran, General
Longstreet made a last effort to order the mob to disperse, but he was dragged
down from his horse and wounded by a spent bullet. With his capture the battle
was essentially over. Although it had not lasted long, it was intense and resulted
in over a hundred casualties.28 As the wounded Longstreet
was being led into the Customs House where the White League was holding its
prisoners the victors were shouting out the rebel yell in triumph.
The General stopped before the door of his prison, took a moment to survey the
crowd, and remarked, I have heard the yell before.29
President Grant eventually interceded by sending Federal troops and three warships
to support the Kellogg government and put an end to the White Leagues
insurrection. After Reconstruction ended in 1877, however, Democrats regained
control of the city and the Louisiana state government in subsequent elections.
The White Leagues efforts were hailed as heroic. The memory of Liberty
Place is a difficult one to place, and a memorial to the White League forces
goes largely unnoticed on the neutral ground of Canal Street. Pro-Confederate
historian Stuart Landry dedicates his book on Liberty Place to, The memory
of the heroes of the fourteenth of September, whose patriotism should be an
inspiration, not only to their descendants, but to all Louisianans of good intent.30
Longstreet was no longer merely an archetypal scalawag, he had led the defense
against a force of ex-Confederates who had immediately become heroes of the
New Orleans resistance to Reconstruction. As a result of his role in the Battle
of Liberty Place, Longstreets vilification in the eyes of white Southerners
was unique in its depth.
Longstreets service to New Orleans on September 14th deserves more credit
than it has received. He was a soldier performing his duty once more with absolutely
no regard for his own personal safety in the face of daunting odds. In the aftermath,
Longstreet was demonized by the Democrats. For the former second-in-command
of the Confederate army to literally turn troops against former comrades was
insufferable, and New Orleans became a dangerous place for Longstreet to walk
the streets. The General, nevertheless, remained in the Crescent City and continued
to work at making a life for himself.
Three years after the Battle of Liberty Place, on March 7, 1877, James Longstreet
converted to Catholicism. Research located in the Georgetown University Archives
revealed a letter in which Father Semper of the New Orleans Jesuits comments
about the conversion of Longstreet.31 Semper writes that when
Longstreet had lost the battle of Liberty Place that, Pain to the Generals
heart from the familiar voices opened his eyes to vanity of the world and to
supernatural grace.32 Another possible motivation for
doing so could quite possibly be tied directly to his social unpopularity.33
The Episcopalian Church that he had formerly been a member of, after all, was
the traditional religion of soldiers and various upper-class Southern families
who were migrating to New Orleans in search of opportunity. If Longstreets
life was in danger when he walked the streets, it is not a stretch to believe
that he did not any longer feel welcome in his old church. It should be noted,
however, that James Longstreet did nothing halfway or without conviction and
he as known for being a supporter of the Catholic Church until the end of his
life.34
With Longstreets post-war reputation in shambles it was necessary for
the leaders of the lost cause to attack his military record, and the papers
of the Southern Historical Society (SHS) provided a forum in 1877. These papers
were the mechanism through which the New Orleans based SHS both preserved accounts
of the Civil War and crafted the growing mythology of the lost cause.
The famous reasoning for the Southern defeat, according to the lost cause
mythology, is that the Unions superior manpower and resources could not
be overcome. What was missing from the argument, however, was a sufficient scapegoat
for the battle of Gettysburg, the turning point of the war that seemed a winnable
scenario from the historical perspective of the ex-Confederates. James Longstreets
association with the Republican Party, his role in the Battle of Liberty Place,
and the conciliatory sentiments he expressed in the New Orleans papers made
him an excellent target. This is not to say that there are not valid military
criticisms of Longstreet, but he was being sacrificed for an ideology of portraying
fiction as truth. And by becoming a Republican he abandoned the protection afforded
to Lee and Jackson who became the untouchable patron saints of the South.35
The charge leveled against Longstreet was that the great burden of responsibility
for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, the great what-if of Civil
War history, rested on his shoulders. The accusation, voiced strongly by General
J.A. Early, was that Longstreet had been slow to act at Gettysburg and this
was responsible for the failure of Lees plan that climaxed in Picketts
Charge, a Confederate massacre. Longstreet remained silent against these
charges at first, but then he wrote his own account of the battle for the Southern
Historical Papers. In this account, Longstreet asserted that he had wanted to
fall back and position the Confederate army between Washington D.C. and the
Union forces. In this manner the Union army would be forced to fight on ground
that the Confederates had chosen rather than vice versa.36
Lee did not agree, and this pained Longstreet but he dutifully executed the
orders of his commander with the utmost efficiency and speed.
Longstreet was harshly criticized for his audacity in suggesting that Lee was
anything less than perfect as a strategist and commander. In response to Longstreets
attempt to defend himself, Early wrote, General Longstreet is of the opinion
that he is a very deeply-aggrieved man, because he has not been permitted, without
question, to pronounce that General Lees strategy in the Gettysburg campaign
was very defective; that General Lee had lost his mind when he determined to
deliver battle at Gettysburg
37 At this point it
had become clear that in evaluating the Battle of Gettysburg one was called
upon, in keeping with the lost cause mythology, to make a choice
between Longstreet and Lee. James Longstreet had become the scapegoat of revisionist
history, so that Lee could remain beyond reproach.38
The long debate over Gettysburg continued on long past Longstreets stay
in New Orleans, but his actions in the Crescent City were a major influence
on the interpretation of his war record. Its vital to note that Longstreets
reputation during the Reconstruction era led directly to the further complication
of one of the most tangled debates in Civil War history. Mrs. Zelia Longstreet,
the Generals daughter-in-law by her marriage to his youngest son, commented
on this in an interview with Blue and Gray magazine: He was a great man.
His men loved him. And you know, it wasnt until General Lee died that
this business started of other Southerners blaming him for Gettysburg. They
knew that General Lee would defend Longstreets honor. Even General Lee
didnt blame General Longstreet for the loss at Gettysburg. The other generals
didnt like it that General Longstreet was a friend of General Grant. When
he turned Republican and got government jobs through Grant, when he was President,
a lot of the South hated Longstreet as a turncoat. I think this hurt him bad,
he just wanted to try to help the South the best he could. He was ready to bury
the hatchet and be a good citizen.39 The issue was as
much about the Battle of Liberty Place as it ever was about the Battle of Gettysburg
when it came to the historical interpretation of Lees Old War Horse.
If one were to look solely to the experience of General Longstreet, then the
Southern situation at the close of the Civil War would seem hopeless. A bleak
picture is presented when a recalcitrant South is so opposed to talk of unity
with its former foes that it demonized one of its own heroes upon his voicing
of support for the mending of wounds. From the high aim of the rifles at Liberty
Place to the acidic pages of the Southern Historical Society Journal, it seems
clear that the lost cause is linked directly to a Southern condition
marked by stubborn resentment. Time moved forward, however, and as Reconstruction
ended the impulse to vilify Longstreet began to wane.
Gaines M. Foster in his book, Ghosts of the Confederacy, does not interpret
the lost cause as linked to the idea of a sullen and resentful post-war
Southern condition. Indeed, it is important to note that no single interpretation
of the motivation behind lost cause thinking can be determined entirely
sufficient in its analysis of an entire culture phenomenon. Foster addresses
the actions of Southerners just after the war in saying that, perhaps
their feelings can best be described as a damaged self-image. Defeat in battle
and the exigencies of the wars aftermath wounded southerners confidence
in their righteousness, honor, and manliness.40 This
idea of the lost cause as a sort of therapeutic process in the wake
of the events at Appomattox can be compelling.
Fosters treatment of Longstreet is brief but insightful given the unique
context of his own interpretation of the lost cause. It is Fosters
contention that Longstreets ongoing historical rehabilitation is a sign
of the Souths healing from its wounded pride after the loss of the Civil
War. Foster remarks that in this new period, Accounts of Gettysburg now
celebrated the glorious failure of Picketts charge as often as they damned
the opportunity lost because of Longstreets alleged tardiness.41
The real vindication for Longstreet came with the warm welcomes he received
during monument unveilings and Confederate gatherings in the 1890s. Although
the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) declined to send him invitations to certain
events, he would show up anyway to standing ovations and a steady stream of
former soldiers wanting to shake the hand of the General who had cared so deeply
for their well being.42 Despite these events, however, the
issue of Longstreets reputation remains a hot topic of debate in Civil
War circles.
Longstreet has never received the honors and praise awarded to other members
of the Confederate high command. The General lived in New Orleans for ten years
and his stay in the city is seldom remarked upon. He served the city of New
Orleans in a variety of capacities during his residence here and after leaving.
For instance, he returned to the city to serve on both the school board and
the board of administrators for what is now Tulane University.43
New Orleans, a city with a strong sense of its own history, has no street named
for Longstreet or memorial established in his honor. His choice of sides at
Liberty Place, his willingness to risk his life for duty and conviction, earned
him little in the way of public historical remembrance. This deserves not only
re-assessment, but also recognition that there was something at work in post-bellum
New Orleans more insidious than an injured Southern pride.
There is a certain tragic quality to the life of James Longstreet in New Orleans.
He made every effort to achieve economic success after the war and met with
several years of increasing debts and poverty in return. He outlined his brief
opinions on the Souths path to post-bellum recovery and found his place
in what was left of Southern society lost. Longstreet fought bravely for the
Confederacy and nearly died on the field and his legacy became tarnished by
a sweeping effort to place the blame for the loss at Gettysburg on his shoulders.
James Longstreet suffered for having the courage of his convictions, and to
a large degree he suffered unduly.
He cast off most of his laurels when he became a Republican, but his war record
was still pristine. Revisionist historians stretched facts and carved up his
reputation with surgical precision. The pendulum swings both ways, however,
and a more careful examination of Ole Pete for who he was as a man,
for both his virtues and human weaknesses, reveals that he was not the villain
of the South that he was made out to be. Longstreet was an older soldier trying
to make a life for himself and his people in a changing world in the best way
that he knew how.
James Longstreet was a man of values, the sort of person who said what he meant
and meant what he said. Upon his death, President Theodore Roosevelt attributed
to General Longstreet, the fine and high-souled patriotism which made
him, when the war was ended, as staunchly loyal to the Union as he had been
loyal to the cause for which he fought during the war itself.44
This never served him well politically or socially in the demanding society
of post-war New Orleans, but his failure to conform to those circles should
not now tarnish his reputation. The General was known to have said, Error
lives but a day, truth is eternal, and this is the order to future historians
from Longstreet himself. One important step towards this truth is the full integration
of his life in New Orleans into the story of Lees Old War Horse. With
this piece of the puzzle in place, and the exercise of a critical eye on the
part of historians, then, as on most mornings in the Crescent City, the fog
will be lifted to reveal the light.
Notes
1 http://www.fatherryan.org/father_ryan/poetry.htm.
2 JeffryWert, The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History,
ed. Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2000), 129.
3 CSA Congressional Record, February 17, 1984, No. 42: Joint
Resolutions of Thanks to Lieutenant-General Longstreet and the officers and
men of his command.
4 Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels (New York: Ballantine Publishing
Group, 1974), 350.
5 Jeffrey D. Wert, General James Longstreet (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1933), 410.
6 David Blight, Race and Reunion, (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 110.
7 It should be noted, however, that the debate of the lost cause
is far from over. One example of this is the recently released film Gods
andGenerals, described by David Blight, a Yale historian, as a celluloid
monument to the lost cause. This charge is based on the films exceedingly
light treatment of race issues, failure to depict the human side of Generals,
and the funding by media mogul Ted Turner that put control of the film solely
in the hands of director Ron Maxwell.
8 William Piston, Lees Tarnished Lieutenant (Georgia:
Georgia University Press, 1987), 218.
9 New Orleans was a dirty, impoverished, and hopeless
city, with a mixed, ignorant, corrupt, and bloodthirsty gang in control. It
was flooded with lotteries, gambling dens, and licensed brothels. Many of the
city officials, as well as the police force, were thugs and murderers,
wrote Henry Clay Warmoth.; Warmoth, Henry Clay. War, Politics, and Reconstruction,
(New York: MacMillan Co., 1930), 79-82.
10 Interview of Mrs. Zelia Longstreet by Blue and Gray magazine
in 1983.
11 Robert M. Steckler, M.D. The Cervical Would of General James
Longstreet. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Head and Neck Society,
Palm Desert, California, April 26, 1999.
12 Jaynes, Gregory. The Killing Ground: Wilderness to Cold
Harbor. (Time Life, 1986), 79.
13 New Orleans Public Library Archives.
14 Longstreet to Francis Smith at VMI: December 03, 1868.
15 Francis Smith at Virginia Military Institute to Longstreet:
October 11, 1870.
16 Francis Smith at Virginia Military Institute to Longstreet:
July 24, 1871.
17 Blight, 263.
18 James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox
19 Wert, General James Longstreet , 414.
20 Samuel H. Williamson, What is the Relative Value?
Economic History Services, April 2002, URL: http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/
21 Longstreet, 637.
22 New York Times, July 24, 1885.
23 http://www.enlou.com/people/kelloggwp-bio.htm; Wert, General
James Longstreet, 415.
24 Wert, General James Longstreet, 416; John Kemp
25 Blight, 110.
26 Kemp, 114 -115.
27 Wert, General James Longstreet, 416; Kemp. 114-115.
28 http://www.agribusinesscouncil.org/Battle-Liberty.htm; Kemp,
115; Wert, 417.
29 Stuart Landry. The Battle of Liberty Place. (New Orleans:
Pelican Publishing, 1955), 193.
30 Landry, book dedication.
31 Georgetown University Special Collections: Thomas Meehan
Letters.
32 Letter from Father H.C. Semper, S.J. to Fr. Thomas Meehan,
January 26, 1910.
33 Yet another possibility is that he was influenced towards
Catholicism by his second wife and this is mentioned by some of his biographers
and in the Thomas Meehan Letters. This, however, doesnt make sense given
that he converted a number of years before moving to Georgia and meeting Helen
Dortch, his second wife.
34 Wert, 418.
35 Wert, James Longstreet and the Lost Cause, 131; General
J.A. Early, Reply to Longstreets Second Paper, Southern Historical Society
Papers, 270.
36 From Shaaras The Killer Angels; Lectures of Dr. Michael
Ross, Loyola University New Orleans, Fall 2002.
37 Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 5, 270.
38 Wert, James Longstreet and the Lost Cause, 131.
39 Interview of Mrs. Zelia Longstreet by Blue and Gray magazine
in 1983.
40 Gaines M. Foster. Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the
Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), 35.
41 Foster, 120.
42 Shaara 350, Foster, 120, Wert, General James Longstreet,
424-425.
43 Wert, General James Longstreet ,418.
44 In a letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Helen Longstreet,
June 07, 1904; http://www.tennessee-scv.org/longstreet/post1.htm.